GUJRAT 2002 Genocide - Role of the police.

Overview

POLICE COMMISSIONER PC Pandey (recently removed from the post of Gujarat DGP by the Election Commission) ordered that the 700-800 dead bodies at Naroda Patiya be clandestinely picked up and dumped all over Ahmedabad to reduce the toll of the massacre

BAJRANG DAL LEADER Babu Bajrangi says he surrendered when Narendra Modi asked him to do so. Joint Commissioner (Crime Branch) PP Pandey and his men arrested him, and told him it was all part of a show

ON PAPER, District Superintendent of Police ND Solanki sent a local Sangh leader to judicial custody, but in reality he sent him to stay in a VHP office

DCP GADVI promised VHP'S Kalupurzila mantri Ramesh Dave that he would kill "at least four-five Muslims" if Dave pointed them out to him. Dave took him to a house from where a group of Muslims could be seen. "Before we knew it, he'd killed five people," Dave said

INSPECTOR KG ERDA told the mob gathered outside the Gulbarg society it had three hours to do its work. The mob went berserk. One man was hacked to death in front of Erda

ERDA told VHP workers to set fire to a vehicle carrying Muslims. He said that the police constable accompanying the vehicle would run away. "The whole episode will end here itself and there will be no question of framing a case against anyone," he said

Khaki Klan Killers

ASHISH KHETAN

From willing connivance to leading attacks on Muslims, the police smoothed the path for the rioters in every way they could

Aim to kill Senior police officers did not just supervise the mayhem, they shaped it

AT AROUND 6pm on March 2, 2002, in Bhavnagar district's Ghogha Road, over 200 Muslim children were sheltering in a madarsa when a Hindu mob descended on it, baying for blood. Rahul Sharma, then Bhavnagar Superintendent of Police (SP), ordered his troops to open fire. The mob dispersed, the children were saved.

Over the next two weeks, after the Bhavnagar incident, the police took similarly courageous action at a few other places. By March 16, eight people had been killed in police firing in Bhavnagar district; five were Hindu, two Muslim. Timely intervention kept the district more or less free of killings. On March 16, however, at 10:10am, Sharma received a call from then Minister of State for Home Gordhan Zadaphia.

"Zadaphia said that while I had done a good job, the ratio of those who died in the police firing was not proper — he was complaining about there being more Hindu deaths than Muslim. I told him things would depend on the ground situation and the nature of the mob," Sharma said in his deposition before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.

Sharma also told the Commission that when he had called up then Director General of Police K. Chakravarty on March 1, 2002, at around 10:20pm, to request the deployment of additional forces in Bhavnagar, the DGP had said that "though he would send one State Reserve Police Force company the next morning, I should not expect more help as the bureaucracy had been completely compromised."

The two conversations Rahul Sharma had with Zadaphia and the Director General of Police provide ample indication of the role the majority of the police force played during the 2002 massacre, joining ranks with the mobs that were setting Gujarat on fire. From egging on murderous hordes to go for the kill, to supplying them with ammunition, to transporting bombs between districts, to opening fire at Muslims who were already under attack from Hindu rioters — the police facilitated the massacre in every possible way.

Here are some firsthand accounts from the rioters and conspirators of the help they received from sections of the police in the nightmare days when the upholders of law turned into rioters in uniform.

'The Cops Did As The State Wished'

Talking to HARINDER BAWEJA, former ADGP Intelligence, RB Sreekumar, endorses the rioters' view that the government was on their side

When you were ADGP intelligence, had you filed a report saying weapons had been smuggled from Sabarkantha?
In 2002, weapons were recovered from some Muslim areas. Our information was that they were manufactured in an iron works unit in Wadgam, owned by a VHP worker. I had sent the report in writing and also informed KR Kaushik, then the Ahmedabad police chief. When they conducted a raid, nothing was found, but I learned later that the raiding party had leaked the information, which is why nothing was found. The press found out and Hindustan Times ran a front-page report. They kept harassing me but nothing came of it. It was strongly suspected that they were manufacturing tamanchas — country-made firearms.

Were these weapons used during the riots?
This information came later on. An inquiry was ordered against me — but the DGP said no action could be taken because it is routine for Intelligence to share information.

Was any action taken against the raid party?
(laughs) The raid party's action was in tune with the political interests of the ruling party. The recovery was shown from the Muslims to make the point that the police was doing a good job of maintaining law and order. Subsequently, on August15, DG Vanzara and others were rewarded for this recovery.

Did you file any reports on the flow of arms or bombs during the riots?
Copies of my reports were appended in my first affidavit to the Nanavati-Shah Commission. There was a report on the distribution of trishuls. I took over in April 2002; by then, the frenzy had come down. I had sent reports saying FIRS were not registered properly, many offences were being clubbed together and that the names of the VHP leaders at the head of the mob were being left out of FIRs. This became a controversy. On none of these reports did the government take any follow-up action or seek any clarification. That is very relevant.